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Donkeys, Elephants, and Barney Fife:
Are Deputy Sheriffs Policymakers Subject to
Patronage Termination?
DiRuzzav. County of Tehama'

I. INTRODUCTION
The practice of patronage2 is virtually as old as the Republic itself?
Beginning with President Washington and continuing until the early 1970s,
elected officials were safe in their reliance upon a perceived right to surround
themselves, through appointments and dismissals, with politically like-minded
subordinates.
This privilege was considered a part of the spoils of political
4
victory.

Beginning inthe 1970s, however, the Supreme Court started chipping away
at the practice ofpatronage through a series of decisions that barred the dismissal
of public employees based solely on their political affiliation.5 Nevertheless, the
Court recognized limited exceptions for discharging employees whom the Court

1. 206 F.3d 1304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct 624 (2000).
2. Webster's Dictionary defines "patronage" as "the power to make appointments
to government jobs especially for political advantage." WFasTES's NInm NEW
LGAnDIcIoNARY 863 (9th ed. 1986).
Co~G
3. See Susan Lorde Martin, A Decade of Branti Decisions: A Government
Official's Guide to PatronageDismissals,39 Ai U. L. REV. 11 (1989). "The firsttime

in American history that a government employee was dismissed because of a political
affiliation probably occured in 1797, when the Secretary of the Treasury, a Federalist,
fired the United States Commissioner of Revenue, an avid Republican." Id. at 14.
4. See Louis Cammarosano, NoteApplicationofthe FirstAmendmentto Political
PatronageEmployment Decisions, 58 FORDHAm L. REv. 101, 103 (1989).
5. While the Supreme Court first addressed the constitutional issues arising from
patronage in the 1970s, patronage already had begun to decline in popularity in many
jurisdictions. Jamie Johnson, Note & Comment, O'Hare Truck Serv. Inc. v. City of
Northlake: FurtherLimiting the Spoils of the Victor, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 489, 492
(1998). Public concern about patronage abuses led to the enactment ofthe PendletonAct
of 1883, which established the civil service system, and enactment of the Hatch Political
Activities Act of 1939, which limited the political activities of federal employers. See
Kathleen I Dugan, Note, An Objective and PracticalTest for AdjudicatingPolitical
PatronageDismissals, 35 CLEv. ST.L. REv. 277, 280 n.22 (1990). However, this

legislation failed to protect non-civil service government employees. Id.
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labeled "policymakers" 6 or "confidential employees." These exceptions resulted
in the eruption of more than twenty years of inconsistent rulings by lower courts
regarding which government positions entail policymaking and, more
fundamentally, how best to approach that question.
This Note examines DiRuzza v. County of Tehama, a recent Ninth Circuit
decision that takes a case-specific approach to defining the position of deputy
sheriff for the purpose of deciding whether that position involves policymaking
and is, therefore, subject to patronage. Furthermore, this Note reviews the
landscape of other circuit court decisions on the susceptibility of deputy sheriffs
to patronage termination, including the Eighth Circuit's relative silence on the
issue. Finally, this Note argues that the Supreme Court should sanction the
approach espoused by DiRuzza in an effort to harmonize what has become a
cacophonous mix of lower court voices on the issue of patronage.
II. FACTS AND HoLDING
From 1992 to 1995, Sherol DiRuzza was a deputy sheriffin Tehama County,
California.9 During the election campaign of 1994, DiRuzza publicly supported
the campaign ofincumbent SheriffMike Blanusa,0 who lost his bid for re-election
to Robert Heard."
After the election, but during Blanusa's tenure, DiRuzza was suspended for
thirty days. 2 The suspension followed a domestic dispute in which DiRuzza
discharged her service revolver out of her bedroom window. 3 The district
attorney charged DiRuzza with a felony and a misdemeanor as a result of this

6. The introduction of the term "policymaker" in the context of patronage in Elrod
v. Burns,427 U.S. 347, 367 (1976), was unaccompanied by a clear definition ofthe term.

See infranote 45.
7. The term "confidential employee" is first introduced in the context of patronage
dismissals in Brantiv. Finkel,445 U.S. 507, 510-11 (1980). This use of the term, as a
synonym for "policymaker," appears again only inRutan v. RepublicanPartyofIll., 497
U.S. 62,71 n.5 (1990).
8. 206 F.3d 1304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 624 (2000).
9. Id. at 1306.
10. Id. at 1307. DiRuzza's support of her employer included an appearance in a
political television advertisement on his behalf. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. During the dispute, DiRuzza's flanc6 "allegedly damaged her car, tore her
phone offthe wall, and threatened her with physical violence." Id. DiRuzza claimed she
was being threatened with a rifle and fired eight shots from her service revolver in an
attempt "to get the neighbors to call the authorities." Id. at 1314.
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incident' 4 Upontaking office, Heard allowed DiRuzza to plead guilty to a single,
lesser charge of disturbing the peace in exchange for DiRuzza's resignation from
her position as deputy sheriff."
On March 26, 1996, DiRuzza filed suit in federal district court against
Tehama County, Sheriff Heard, and Undersheriff Jerry Floyd, 6 claiming she had
been fired in retaliation for her political support of Blanusa during the election
campaign." The defendants initially denied that any political motivation led to
DiRuzza's firing," contending instead that DiRuzza lost herjob solely as a result
of the incident that led to her suspension by then-Sheriff Blanusa. 9 DiRuzza
disputed this assertion, 20 and the defendants subsequently filed a supplemental
briefwhereinthey argued that any knowledge on their part of DiRuzza's political
activities relative to the election was immaterial because "no constitutional
prohibition against an elected sheriff's termination of a deputy for partisan
reasons" existed. 2 The district court agreed and granted summary judgment for
all of the defendants, concluding that the First Amendment did not protect
DiRuzza from partisan dismissals because deputy sheriffs in California are

14. Id. DiRuzza was charged with the felony of "gross negligent discharge of a
firearm" andthe misdemeanor of"exhibiting a firearm in arude and threatening manner"
in violation of California Penal Code Sections 246.3 and 417(a)(2). Id.
15. Id. DiRuzza claimed that Heard influenced the district attorney's decision to
charge DiRuzza with a felony and in his offer of a plea agreement, which included
DiRuzza's resignation. Id. DiRuzza charged that "this influence was motivated by a
desire to retaliate againstDiRuzza forherpolitical support of the incumbent Sheriff." Id.
at 1314-15.
16. Id.at 1307. Initially, DiRuzza's suit alleged twelve federal and state causes of
action, but by the time the district court ruled, DiRuzza had limited her suit to claims
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, seeking damages as a remedy. Id.
17. Id. DiRuzza "alleged that due to her political support of Blanusa and
opposition to Heard, she was not re-sworn as a deputy after the election, was givan
undesirable shifts, and was forced to accept resignation under threat ofa felony charge."
Id.
18. Id. At summary judgment, the defendants offered as an undisputed, material
fact that neither Floyd nor Heard had any knowledge of DiRuzza's political support for
Blanusa. Id.

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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policymakers' and that it is appropriate for a sheriff to demand political loyalty
from his or her deputies.'
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment, finding that the defendants had "failed to show as a matter of law that
DiRuzzawas apolicymaker and that political loyalty was therefore an appropriate
requirement for her job."24 The circuit court remanded the case to the district
court for a determination of "whether [DiRuzza's] actual duties were those of a
policymaker."''
The court held that, when the job description of a public
employee delineates no consistent and universal responsibilities, whether that
employee is apolicymaker subject to patronage termination cannot be determined
based solely on that employee's job description, free speech activities, or
unperformed, potential duties; rather, the question must be decided based upon an
analysis of that employee's actual, day-to-day activities.26
IT[. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Prior to the 1970s, the constitutionality of patronage was not questioned."
Government employment was considered a privilege rather than a right,and courts
allowed employers to require that a potential employee self-limit his or her free
speech rights in exchange for that privilege.' However, by the beginning of that
decade, it was clear the Supreme Court had rejected this "right-privilege"

22. The court based this determination, inpart, upon California Government Code
Section 24100, which describes a deputy sheriff as exercising "the same general authority
as the sheriff." Id. The court also relied upon the findings ofthree other circuits thathave
held that deputy sheriffs are policymakers. See Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1164
(4th Cir. 1997) (en bane), cert. denied,522 U.S. 1090 (1998); Upton v. Thompson, 930

F.2d 1209, 1210 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 906 (1992); Terryv. Cook, 866
F.2d 373, 377 (1lth Cir. 1989).
23. DiRuzza, 206 F.3d at 1306. The district court further held, in the alternative,
that Heard and Floyd, as individual defendants, were entitled to qualified immunity
because the rights DiRuzza claimedwere violated weie not clearly established at the time
the alleged violation occurred. Id. at 1307. The court also declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over DiRuzza's remaining state claims. Id.
24. Id. at 1306.
25. Id.The court also held, in response to the defendants' alternative assertion of
qualified immunity, that the law protecting non-policymakers from partisan firing was
clearly established at the time of DiRuzza's firing. Id. The court remanded the case for
consideration of the defendants' reasonableness relative to DiRuzza's firing "in light of
the then-clearly established law." Id.
26. Id. at 1309-10.
27. See Johnson, supranote 5, at 493.
28. See Johnson, supranote 5, at 493.
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distinction in determining the relationship between governmental benefits and
constitutional rights?' In 1972, the Court announced, more specifically, that
government employment could not be withheld in lieu of ajob applicant's partial
forfeiture of his or her First Amendment speech rights." Having addressed the
constitutional propriety of withholding government employment for political
reasons, the stage was set for the Court to speak specifically to the practice of
3
patronage termination by governmental employers. '
A. The Supreme Court'sElrod-Branti Test'
InElrodv.Burns, 3 the Supreme Court addressed the practice ofpatronage
termination for the first time 4 and, in a plurality opinion delivered by Justice
Brennan, held thatpatronage dismissals are unconstitutional because they violate
the right to free speech and association under the First Amendmente In Elrod,
a newly-elected Democratic sheriff fired four Republican employees of the
previous administration 35 upon their reflisalto become Democrats, pledge support

29. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971) (citing Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963), for the proposition that the Court had "rejected the
concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is
characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege"); see also Belly. Burson, 402 U.S. 535,539
(1971); Goldberg v.Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,262 (1970).
30. Pen-y v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (Goveinment "may not deny
a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected
interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech).
31. See Johnson, supranote 5, at 494.
32. The line of analysis reviewed inthis Part represents only one of two streams of
the Supreme Courts treatmentofFirstAmendmentissues relatedtopatronage. This line
of cases applies when a public employee complains of being fired for his or her political
affiliation. Whenthe issue is an employee's right to speak on anissue ofpublic concern,
courts are guided by Pickeringv. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and its
progeny, which apply a balancing approach between a public employee's right to free
expression and the government's interest in discharging the employee for exercising that
right See Craig D. Singer, Comment, Conduct andBelief. PublicEmployees' First
AmendmentRights to FreeExpressionandPoliticalAffiliation,59 U. CM. L. REV. 897,
897-98 (1992).
33. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
34. See Brent C. Eckersley, Note, ConstitutionalLaw:Bd. of County Conim'rs v.
Umbehr and O'Hare Truck Serv. v. City of Northake-The Extension of First
Amendment Protectionto IndependentContractors-TheGarbageManCanNow Talk
Trash!, 50 OnLA. L. REV. 557, 559 (1997).

35. Elrod,427 U.S. at 363.
36. Id. at 349-50. The discharged employees included: the chief deputy of the

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

5

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 4

MISSOURILA WREVIEW

[Vol. 66

to Democratic candidates, or contribute to the Democratic party." The fired
employees sued, claiming the First Amendment prohibited their termination based
solely upon their political affiliation." The defendants argued the firings were
constittional, baseduponthreegovemmentalinterests: (1) effective and efficient
government; (2) the preservation of a healthy political process; and (3) the need
for loyal employees to implement the policies of elected officials. 9 The Court
employed an "exacting scrutiny" standard in considering the constitutionality of
the firings,4 and held that a partisan firing "must further some vital government
end by a means that is least restrictive of freedom of belief and association in
achieving that end, and the benefit gained must outweigh the loss of the
constitutionally protected rights." ' 1 Under this test, the Court rejected the
defendants' arguments regarding efficiency and the protection of political
processes,42 but it found limited merit in the argument that political loyalty is
essential "to the end that representative government not be undercut by tactics
obstructing the implementation of policies of the new administration, policies
presumably sanctioned by the electorate."43 Notwithstanding the strength of this
argument, the Court found it "inadequate to validate patronage wholesale" and
held that "[1]imiting patronage dismissals to policymaking positions is sufficient
to achieve this governmental end."" Furthermore, the Court held that government
employers wishing to justify partisan dismissals based on this policymaking
exception would bear the burden of proof in showing how the nature of the fired
employee's duties made the employee a policymaker and, therefore, subject to
patronage dismissal.45 Following Elrod, the constitutionality of the partisan

process division, a process server, a bailiff, and a fourth employee whose positionwas not
described. Id. at 350-51.
37. Id. at 355.
38. Id. at 350.

39. Id. at 364-68. The defendants included: the newly elected Democratic Sheriff
Richard J. Elrod, Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley, the Democratic Organization of Cook
County, Illinois, and the Democratic County Central Committee of Cook County, Illinois.
Id. at 349-50.
40. Id. at 362.
41. Id. at 363.
42. Id. at 364, 369.
43. Id. at 367.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 368. Justice Brennan stated that in "determining whether an employee
occupies a policymaking position, consideration should ... be given to whether the

employee acts as an advisor or formulates plans for the implementation of broad goals."
Id. However, Brennan acknowledged that "[n]o clear line can be drawn between
policymaking and nonpolicymaking positions." Id. at 367.
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dismissal of a public employee turned on whether the employee was a
policymaker. If so, the firing was constitutionallyjustified.I
Fouryears afterElrodwasdecided, the Courtrefined its "policymaking test'
in Branti v. Finkel. In Brcmti, two Republican public defenders sued the
Democratic public defender who allegedly was about to fire thenmbased solely on
their party membersMhip.'
The defendant argued that Elrod only forbade
patronage dismissals in cases where the fired employee actuallyhad been coerced
into changing party affiliation or supporting the political party of the employer.'
Concerning situations where an employee suffers partisan firing sans any effort
by the employer to coerce the employee into renouncing his or her political
affiliation, the defendant contended Elrodwas silent"0 In a five-to-three opinion
delivered by Justice Stevens, the Court rejected the defendant's arguments and
tightenedtheElrodrule,holding that "the ultimate inquiry is notwhether thelabel
'policymaker' ... fits a particular position; rather, the question is whether the
hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate
requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved."'
B. Circuits'ApplicationofElrod-Branti
Whilethe lower federal courts thathave addressedpatronagesinceElrodand
Branti have acknowledged the standards announced therein, their application of
the standards has created a less-than-uniform legal landscape.52 The apparent
clarity of the policymaking exception in Elrodand the "appropriate requirement!

46. See Eckersley, supranote 34, at 560.
47. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
48. Id. at 508.
49. Id.at 516.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 523.
52. See Upton v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209, 1212 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
503 U.S. 906 (1992) (Following Elrod and Branti, circuit court opinions regarding
patronage have been "conflicting and confusing."). Such uncertainty in the circuits'
application of the Elrod-Brantischeme was predicted by Justice Powell inBranti: "The
standard articulated by the Court is framed in vague and sweeping language certain to
create vast uncertainty. Elected and appointed officials at all leels... no longer will
know when political affiliation is an appropriate consideration in filling a position."
Brantiv. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507,524(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). Similar misgivings
concerning how employers would determine which government positions enjoy ElrodBrantiprotection were expressed in a later case by Justice Scalia, who predicted that the
test is "so generalthatformostpositions it is impossible to knowwhetherparty affiliation
is a permissible requirement until a court renders its decision." Rutan v. Republican
Party of lL, 497 U.S. 62, 111 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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test ofBrantiP notwithstanding, the circuits have been left to fend for themselves
in deciding which government positions are protected under Elrod-Brantiand,
more basically, in developing a uniform standard for making that determination.
The Ninth Circuit first applied the Elrod-Brantirule to a suit brought by a
4
deputy sheriff in Thomas v. Carpenter.1
Although the plaintiff-lieutenant sheriff
in Thomas was not fired, he alleged that he was excluded from departmental
decision-making processes because of his unsuccessful bid for election to his
employer's job." The circuit court reversed a dismissal of the deputy sheriffs
claim by the district court because "[the defendant employer could] not show,
based solely on the allegations of [the] complaint, that [the plaintiff's] political
loyalty [was] essential to the effective performance of the tasks removed from his
list of responsibilities." 56 In so ruling, the circuit court intimated that no per se
rule existed in the Ninth Circuit for determining the policymaking status of deputy
sheriffs; instead, the "critical inquiry is the job actually performed.""'
58 the Ninth Circuit outlined
In Fazio v. City andCounty of San Francisco,
several factors to consider in determining whether political affiliation
constitutionally can be considered in connection with governmental employment
decisions." The court looked to these factors and the actual duties performed by
the plaintiff-employee in determining that an assistant district attorneylegitimately
could be subject to partisan dismissal.' Taken together, Thomas and Fazio
indicate that the Ninth Circuit does not adhere to a "one size fits all" definition of
"deputy sheriff' for the purpose of determining the deputy's policymaking status,
but, instead, applies a multi-factor test to a specific employee's actual duties in
light of statutory or judicial definitions of the employee's position.

53. Branti,445 U.S. at 518.
54. 881 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,494 U.S. 1028 (1990).
55. Id. at 829.
56. Id. at 832.

57. DiRuzza v. County of Tehama, 206 F.3d 1304, 1310 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
121 S. Ct 624 (2000). The holding in Thomas suggested the impropriety ofruling, as the
district court did inDiRuzza,that the policymnaking status of deputy sheriffs in California

can be gleaned solely from a statutory provision that allows a sheriffto appoint his or her
"deputies" when thatjob is defined to include positions ranging from undersheriffto jail
custodian. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 24101 (West 1988 & Supp. 2001).

58. 125 F.3d 1328 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,523 U.S. 1074 (1998).
59. Id. at 1334. The list of factors included: "vague or broad responsibilities,
relative pay, technical competence, power to control others, authorityto speak inthe name
ofpolicymakers, public perception, influence on programs, contact with elected officials,
and responsiveness to partisan politics and political leaders." Id. at 1334 n.5 (quoting
Hall v. Ford, 856 F.2d 255, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).

60. Id. at 1334.
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Several circuits have employed an approach similar to the Ninth Circuit's
"position-specific' analysis in determining the policymaldng status of deputy
sheriffs, even if their conclusions have not been uniform. The Fourth, Seventh,
and Eleventh Circuits have applied a position-specific analysis in reaching the
conclusionthat deputy sheriffs are subjectto patronage dismissal underElrodand
Branti.6 ' In Jenkinsv. Medford,' the Fourth Circuit upheld the firings of several
North Carolina deputy sheriffs who had campaigned for the defendant-sheriff's
predecessor.' In doing so, the court characterized its approach as a move away
from "wholesale pronouncements." such as those it previously had enunciated
in Jones v. Dodson-the court's first effort at applying Elrod-Brantito deputy
sheriffs 6 --in favor of "position-specific analyses."*
InUpton v. Thompsono the Seventh Circuitreversed adistrict court's denial
of summary judgment for two Illinois sheriffs who claimed qualified immunity as
a defense in a suit by their deputies for patronage termination." In a manner
favorable to the defendant-employers, the court interpreted two prior Seventh
Circuit cases69 that held that "nonpolicyrmaldng officials were... subject to
politically-based firing because they were vested with substantial discretionary
authority in the implementation of the policy goals of elected officials.' '0 The
61. See Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S.
1090 (1998); Uptonv. Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209 (7thCir. 1991). cert.denied, 503 U.S.
906 (1992); Terry v. Cook. 866 F.2d 373 (1lth Cir. 1989).
62. 119 F.3d 1156 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,522 U.S. 1090 (1998).
63. Id.at 1164. The court based its determination that the plaintiffs-deputies were
policymakers on its reading of a North Carolina statute that describes the deputy sheriff
as holding "an office of special trust and confidence, acting in the name of and with
powers coterminous with his principal, the elected sheriff:" Id. at 1163; see also N.C.
GEN. STAX. § 17E-1 (1996).
64. Jenkins, 119 F.3d at 1162.
65. The Dodson court held that "the duties of deputy sheriffs, no matter what the
size of the office, or the specific position of power invol,... could [not] be found to
involve policymaking." Jones v. Dodson, 726 F.2d 1329, 1338 (4th Cir. 1984).
66. Jenkins, 119 F.3d at 1162.
67. 930 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,503 U.S. 906 (1992).
68. Id. at 1218. Inthis consolidated appeal, the defendants-employers claimed
qualified immunity from liability based on their contention that the law concerning
patronage dismissals of deputy sheriffs was unsettled at the time of the deputies'
termination. Id. at 1211.
69. See Tomczak v. City of Chicago, 765 F.2d 633 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 946 (1985); Livas v. Petka, 711 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1983).
70. Upton, 930 F.2d at 1215. Notably, the Tomczak court held that "Elrodand
Brantirequire examination of the powers inherent in a given office, as opposed to the
functionsperformedby aparticularoccupantof thatoffice." Tomczak, 765 F.2d at 640
(emphasis added).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

9

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 4

MISSOURI LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 66

court held that deputy sheriffs "operate with a sufficient level of autonomy and
discretionary authority to justify a sheriff's use of political considerations when
determining who will serve as deputies.''
In Terry v. Cook,72 the Eleventh Circuit upheld the politically motivated
firing ofAlabama deputy sheriffs. 3 Citing case law that describes the relationship
between sheriff and deputy as that of principal and agent,74 the Terry court held
that "[t]o mandate that a sheriff must accept the deputies that he finds in office
simply because they belong to another political party even though he is totally
responsible for all their acts is incredible, and beyond the bounds of common
75
sense.
The Third, Sixth, 'and Tenth Circuits have employed similar position-specific
analyses while coming to the contrary conclusion that deputy sheriffs are not
subject to patronage dismissal under the Elrod-Brantischeme.7 6 In Burns v.
County of Cambriaf7 the Third Circuit held that deputy sheriffs whose primary
tasks included service of process, courtroom security, and transport of prisoners
were not subject to partisan dismissal because political affiliation was not an
appropriate prerequisite to employment for these positions.78 The court was
unpersuaded by the argument that "the need for loyalty and confidentiality alone

71. Upton, 930 F.2d at 1218. While the court cited no legislative or case authority
for its description of the nature of deputy sheriffs' duties, it analogized the actual duties
of the plaintiffs to the level of autonomy and discretionary powers of municipal water
department employees, as in Tomczak, and public prosecutors, as inLivas. Id. at 1215,
1218.
72. 866 F.2d 373 (11th Cir. 1989).
73. Id. at 377.
74. See Taylorv. Gibson, 529 F.2d 709, 716 (5th Cir. 1976); Salterv. Tillman, 420
F. Supp. 5, 8 (S.D. Ala. 1975); Moseley v. Kennedy, 17 So. 2d 536, 537 (Ala. 1944)
(stating that a deputy sheriffis the "alter ego" ofthe sheriff); Ramseyv. Strobach, 52 Ala.
513, 515 (1875); Perkins v. Hopkins, 14 Ala. 536, 537 (1848) (noting a sheriff is civilly
liable for actions performed by his or her deputy).
75. Terry, 866 F.2d at 377 (quoting Whited v. Fields, 581 F. Supp. 1444, 1456
(W.D. Va. 1984)). The court reversed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of claims brought by
a clerk, aninvestigator, a process server, a dispatcher, and ajailer, holding that "ithas not
been established that loyalty to an individual sheriff is an appropriate requirement for
effective job performance for [these positions]." Id.at 377-78.
76. See Hall v. Tollett, 128 F.3d 418 (6th Cir. 1997); Bums v. County of Cambria,
971 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1992), cert.deniedsub nom. Roberts v. Mutsko, 506 U.S. 1081
(1993); Dickeson v. Quarberg, 844 F.2d 1435 (10th Cir. 1988).
77. 971 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. deniedsub nom.Roberts v. Mutsko, 560
U.S. 1081 (1993).
78. Id. at 1022.
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supports politically motivated dismissals independent of the tasks which the
employee must perform"79
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit, in Hall v. Tollett, held that the defendantsheriff "failed to show that political affiliation is 'an appropriate requirement for
the effective performance' ofthepositionofdeputysherifE8 1 The courtmadethis
finding based upon a painstaking description of the specific duties performed by
the six plaintiff-deputy sheriffs,' but it left open the possibility that "in future
cases, defendants will show that the duties and responsibilities of a [particular]
sheriff's deputy make political affiliation an appropriate requirement for
employment in that position."
Finally, the Tenth Circuit, inDickesonv. Quarbergs refused to sanctionthe
patronage dismissal of ahead jailer and a sheriff's administrative assistant based
upon their political relationship with a former sheriff.' In so ruling, the court
stated that "the precise parameters of [the] competing interests" between an
employee's free speech rights and an employer's interest in efficiency "depend on
all the circumstances of a particular case." * The court went on to note that "any
analysis must necessarily begin with the inherent powers of the office at issue.
However, titles alone do notprovide the answer. The critical question whether a
position is one where [patronage is justified] can be answered best by analyzing
the nature of the employee's duties and responsibilities."
The Eighth Circuit has not addressed the issue of deputy sheriffs'
policymaking status relative to a claim ofillegalpatronage undertheElrod-Branti
rule. Were the circuit court to face such a question, it would have circuit
precedent in Bauer v. Bosley,' wherein the patronage firing of a staff legal
assistant to a county circuit court in Missouri was upheld and a district court's
ruling that the employee's First Amendment rights were violated was reversed.'
The court rejected the argument of the plaintiff-employee that no policymaking
duties were part of his job as actually performed, holding that the argument "falls
to comprehend that the proper focus is on the 'powers inherent in a given office,

79. Id.at 1023.
80. 128 F.3d 418 (6th Cir. 1997).
81. Id. at 429 (quoting Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980)).
82. Id. at 424-27.
83. Id. at 429.
84. 844 F.2d 1435 (10th Cir. 1988).
85. Id. at 1443-44.
86. Id. at 1440.
87. Id. at 1442.
88. 802 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987).
89. Id. at 1064.
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as opposed to the functions performed by a particular occupant of that office. "'
It appears that the Eighth Circuit would be disinclined to adopt the approach of
those circuits that utilize an employee-specific analysis of the policymaking status
of deputy sheriffs under Elrod-Branti. 1 More likely, the Eighth Circuit instead
would look no further than the definition of the deputy's position as provided by
statute, ordinance, policy manual, or other official document.'
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In DiRuzza v. County of Tehama, the Ninth Circuit addressed the claim by
Sherol DiRuzza, a discharged California deputy sheriff, that her termination was
an unconstitutional violation of her rights under Elrod and BrantiY. The court
first dealt with the threshold question "whether DiRuzza could be fired for her

90. Id. (quoting Tomczak v. City of Chicago, 765 F.2d 633, 640 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985)).
91. The Dickeson court included the Eighth Circuit in a list of circuits that already
have adopted an employee-specific approach to applying Elrod-Branti. See Dickeson,
844 F.2d at 1443. The Dickeson court based this characterization upon language in
Hortonv.Taylor,767 F.2d 471,477 (8thCir. 1985) ("TheBrantitestis a functional one,
focusing on the actual duties an employee performs."). However, theHorton court made
this statement in the context of discussing the differences between road graders and
deputy sheriffs, not between an individual plaintiff-employee's job description and the
same employee's actual duties. See Horton,767 F.2d at 477.
92. Were the court to apply this approach to the claim of a Missouri deputy sheriff,
the applicable definition of the position would be found in Missouri Revised Statutes
Section 57.270. This Section states that "[e]very deputy sheriff shall possess all the
powers and may perform any of the duties prescribed by law to be performed by the
sheriff." Mo. REv. STAT. § 57.270 (2000). The only distinction made by Missouri
statutes between one full-time deputy sheriff and another is found in Missouri Revised
Statutes Section 57.015, a 2000 "definitions" provision that states that "[a]s used inthis
chapter [describing the duties and responsibilities of sheriffs and their departments] ...
[the] term [deputy sheriff] shall not include any deputy sheriffwith the rank of lieutenant
and above, or any chief deputies, under sheriffs and the command staff as defined by the
sheriff's department policy and procedure manual .... " Mo. REv. STAT. § 57.015
(2000).
93. DiRuzza v. County of Tehama, 206 F.3d 1304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S.

Ct. 624 (2000). DiRuzza was a two-to-one decision, with Justice W. Fletcher delivering
the opinion of the court and Justice O'Scannlain writing in dissent. Id. at 1306, 1305.
While Thomas v. Carpenter,881 F.2d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1989), addressed the rights of
a deputy sheriff in the Ninth Circuit under the Elrod-Brantitest, the issue in that case is
distinguishable from DiRuzza in that the plaintiff in Thomas was never discharged from
his position. Nevertheless, DiRuzza is less a case of first impression for the Ninth Circuit
than an extended application of a previously-announced approach.
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political activity.' 4' Citing Elrodand Branti,the court acknowledged the overarchingprohibition against adverse treatmentby apublic employer of an employee
for exercising his or her First Amendment rights.95 The court then described the
"narrow exception' carved outbytheElrodandBranti courts to FirstAmendment
protection "in cases where the employee is a policyrnaker or confidential
96
employee."
Turning to the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants,
the circuit courtreferred to the three out-of-circuit cases relied uponby the district
court in its holding that DiRuzza was a policymaker subject to partisan
dismissalI Acknowledging that it was "willing to assume arguendo that these
[out-of-circuit] holdings are correct, based on the different nature of the job
performed by deputy sheriffs in these circuits and these states," the circuit court,
nevertheless, stated that it did "not believe that aperse rule concerning deputy
sheriffs is appropriate in this circuit and, in particular, in California.'
Citing a California statute that allows a sheriff to appoint his or her
"deputies"l and an 1888 case defining all peace officers in a sheriff's office as
sheriff's deputies,' the court noted thatin California the title of "deputy" applies
to positions ranging from"undersheriff" to "jail custodian.""' Giventhis lack of
specificity in defining the position of deputy sheriff, the court stated that "[any]
categorization based uponjob title alone obscures rather than clarifies the nature
of the duties actually performed and the constitutional rights at issue."' i The
court characterized as "instructive ' the holding in Board of County
Commissionersv.Umbehr,"' which"rejected a simplified, label-based approach
in a case involving First Amendment rights of government contractors."'"

94. DiRuzza, 206 F.3d at 1308. The court subsequently addressed the defendantsheriff's argument for qualified immunity and theplaintiff's clainithat she was retaliated
against for exercising her First Amendment rights. Id. at 1313-15.
95. Id. at 1308.
96. Id. at 1308-09.
97. Id. at 1309.
98. Id.
99. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 24101 (West 1988 & Supp. 2001).
100. See People v. Otto, 18 P. 869 (Cal. 1888).
101. DiRuzza, 206 F.3d at 1309.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 518 U.S. 668 (1996).
105. DiRuzza, 206 F.3d at 1309. The Courtin Umbehrheldthat a categoricalrule
denying protection to independent contractors "would leave First Amendment rights
unduly dependent on whether state law labels a government service provider's contract
as a contract of employment or a contract for services, a distinctionwhich is atbestavery
poor proxy for the interests at stake." Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 679.
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Analogizing Umbehr to the instant case, the court held that the "range of duties
performed by deputy sheriffs in California" mitigated against a decision that6
deputy sheriffs are necessarily policymakers under an Elrod-Brantianalysis.1
The court rejected two arguments of the defendants-namely, that DiRuzza
"occupied a policymaking position because she gave open political support to the
incumbent sheriff," and, alternatively, "that a deputy sheriff may act as a
poliyrmaker" and, therefore, is apolicymaker.'0 Regarding the former argument,
the court stated that a public employee cannot be a policymaker based on exercise
of free speech rights alone."' The court acknowledged the truth of the latter
argument but labeled it "beside the point" because the "actual, not the possible,
duties of an individual employee determine whetherpolitical loyalty is appropriate
for the effective performance of her job."1 "
Next, the court summarized Thomas v. Carpentarn ° and Fazio v. City and
County ofSan Francisco,"'contending that the "clear import" 1 of Thomas was
that the Ninth Circuit did not recognize a per se definition of the duties of a
California deputy sheriff and that the importance of Faziolay in its restatement" 3
of a multi-factor test for courts to apply to a given employee's duties to determine
his or her policymaking status. 114 Applying the test from Fazio to the duties
actually performed by DiRuzza, the court held that material facts were in dispute,
rendering inappropriate the district court's grant of summary judgment for the
defendants." 5 The courtremanded the case tothe district court for a determination
of DiRuzza's policymaking status based upon an application of the factors listed
in Fazio."6

106. DiRuzza, 206 F.3d at 1309.
107. Id. at 1310 (emphasis in original).
108. Id. The court stated that to rule otherwise would be to hold that "the very act
of engaging in political debate would result in the forfeiture of an employee's First
Amendment rights." Id.

109. Id.
110. 881 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1989).
111. 125 F.3d 1328 (9thCir. 1997).
112. DiRuzza, 206 F.3d at 1310.
113. The test outlined inFaziowas first enunciated inHallv.Ford,856 F.2d 255,
262 (D.C. Cir. 1988). See supranote 59 for the Fazio test.
114. DiRuzza, 206 F.3d at 1310.
115. Id.at 13 10-11. The court suggested that, on the record before it, "there is little
to support a conclusion that DiRuzza is a policymaker." Id. at 1311.
116. Id. The court also held that the lack ofelarity inthe record concemingwhether
DiRuzza was a policyrnaker did not support the defendants' claim of qualified immunity
because the law concerning how a public employee's policymaking status should be
determined was "clearly established" at the time ofDiRuzza's discharge. Id. at 13 13-14.
The court declined to address the undecided issue of the defendants' alleged retaliation
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V. COMMENT
Twenty-four years following the decision in Elrod,and twenty years after
Branti, it remains far from clear which public positions are constitutionally
protected from patronage dismissals and, more flmdamentally, how the Supreme
Court intended the circuits to make such determinations. The prescience of
Justices Powell and Scalia in predicting the current state of confusionm seems
apparent, given the division among the circuits concerning the proper application
of Elrod-Branti. While it may be understandable that the disparity between
jurisdictions' definition of a governmental position would lead to equally-varied
circuit court decisions applying Elrod-Brant!,itis disconcerting thatthere appears
to beno uniformity in the methodology employed by the lower courts inreaching
these decisions. While most circuits purport to adopt aposition-specific analysis
of policymaker status," there is an apparent and critical difference between the
Ninth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits' understanding of "position specific" (looking to
the individual employee's actual duties as performed) andthe interpretation ofthat
term as adopted by the Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits (applying ElrodBranti to the fired employee's pre-termination written job description).
The split among circuits onthe propermethodology in applyingElrod-Brani
makes predicting how the Eighth Circuit would address a claim similar to
DiRuzza's problematic. There appears, however, to be a bent in the Eighth
Circuit toward the "jobdescription!' approach taken in the Fourth, Seventh, and
Eleventh Circuits, if it is assumed the court would follow its own lead as
announced in Bauer."9
Adopting such an approach would be an unfortunate application of ElrodBranti. The holding in DiRuzza represents a fair approach to determining the
validity of claims brought by individual employees in that it refuses to hang the
fortunes of an individual plaintiff on the clarity (or lack thereof) with which a
legislative or administrative body defines the employee's duties. While the
definition of "deputy sheriff" as codified by a particular statute or ordinance may
wellbeinstructive, itis clear fromthe cases discussed hereinthat"all deputies are

against DiRuzza for exercising her First Amendment rights because material facts were
at issue that made such a determination premature. Id. at 1314.
117. See supra note 52.
118. See supranotes 57,61, and 76, and accompanying text.
119. See supranote 91 and accompanying text. Evenif the court adopted this
approach, Mvfissouri's statutory definition of "deputy sheriff" may be less than helpful.
See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 57.015, 57.270 (2000). The court likely would be forced to
perform some level of fact-specific analysis to determine the duties of a particular
plaintiff-deputy sheriff. For Missouri definitions, see supranote 92.
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not created equal."' Elrod-Brantiis better served by a case-by-case analysis of
a plaintiff's actual performance under a Fazio-type test than by an artificial and
inequitable attempt to pigeonhole actual employment duties into often antiquated
and unrealistic job descriptions.

What seems more apparent still is that the disparity between the circuits'
treatment and application of Elrod-Branticries out for resolution by the Supreme
Court. What appears on the surface to be an artificial circuit-split based on

jurisdictions' different definitions of governmental jobs is, in fact, a more serious
state of confusion as to how to apply Elrod-Brantiin the real world. The Court
should follow the lead of decisions such as DiRuzza in resolving the confusion
created by what is otherwise a clear and fair treatment of patronage in Elrodand
Branti.
VI. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding a centuries-old assumption thatpatronage is part and parcel
of the American political landscape, the Supreme Court, in Elrod and Branti,
announced a well-reasoned and sensible restriction on the practice of patronage
termination. 2 ' However, what is a fair and balanced rule in theory has resulted
in inconsistent and, often, unfair results in the lower courts." In DiRuzza, the
Ninth Circuit added its voice to a small-but-growing chorus calling for an
employee-specific standard for adjudicating the individual claims raised bypublic
employees fired for no other reason than their political affiliation. The Supreme
Court and those circuits that apply a more inflexible standard would do well to
join that chorus.
BRYAN R. BERRY

120. In part, the disparity between government employees' roles in different
jurisdictions is a function of"realistic differences among segments ofAmerican society."
Johnson, supra note 5, at 511. For example, the urban sheriff's deputy is less likely to
be involved in policymaking activities than is a deputy in a rural sheriff's department. Id.
To treat both employees equally under an Elrod-Brantianalysis would be inconsistent
and unfair.

121. See supra notes 35, 51, and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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